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Abstract 
This is a contribution to the new economics of skilled labor emigration that focuses on the 
mobility of medical doctors from sending Middle East and North African countries. Economic 
models under risk neutrality and aversion are used. The findings show that the relative 
expected benefits and the emigration rate have major effects on the net relative human 
medical capital that remains in the source country.  The effects of relative wages in the 
destination and sending countries besides the yield of education are likely to change the 
emigration patterns. Comparisons of theoretical and observed relative human capital per 
country averages are conducted and ensured the statistical validity of the model. The 
empirical results based on the available data by Docquier and Marfouk (2006 and 2008) and 
Bhargava, Docquier and Moullan (2010) allowed further use of the model to understand the 
current trends in the emigration of medical doctors.  These trends confirm the magnitude of 
relative wages besides the level of education and the attitude toward risk as determinants of 
the emigration of skilled labor.  The countries included in the study are all exhibiting brain 
gain under 1991-2004 emigration data but two distinct groups of countries are identified. 
Each country is encouraged to anticipate the likely effects of this emigration on the economy 
with the increase of health demand, the domestic wages and the increase in education 
capacity for medical doctors.  
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Introduction 
 
Within the tradition of the new economics of skilled labor migration and as a follow-
up to Driouchi et al. (2009), it has been important to update and apply the 
theoretical framework of the above paper to series of sectors and economies to 
discuss relevant economic and social policies. As the availability of medical doctors 
is crucial for the provision of health care and with the low ratio of doctors to 
patients in most of the Middle Eastern and North African (MENA) countries, the 
emigration of this type of skills is critical.  
The current research focuses on the emigration of medical doctors from sending 
MENA region with data from A. Bhargava, F.Docquier and Y.Moullan (2010). Prior 
version of the latter database is by Docquier and Marfouk (2006 and 2008).   
The objective of this paper is to use a decision model that incorporates economic, 
social and behavioral parameters that may capture the   emigration decisions of 
skilled labor with focus on medical doctors. The economic is represented by the 
relative wages between destination and countries of origin, the social dimension is 
the education level and the behavioral component is related to the attitudes towards 
risk.  
This current article is composed of four sections. The first one is a literature review. 
The second introduces the decision model and its implications. The third section is 
mainly focusing on the model validation with applications to the countries 
composing the region of study. The last part discusses the overall results attained in 
relation to the economic and social policies in the MENA region.  
 
 
I. Literature Review 
 
The emigration of skilled labor and especially of medical doctors is an important 
constraint that limits the satisfaction of the local needs in health care. Several 
authors have analyzed these types of shortages (Qian, 1994; Cooper et al., 2002; 
Lashinger et al., 2005 and Nevidjon et al., 2006). More recent publications are also 
dealing with labor shortages with emphasis on labor and health workers most of the 
 3 
time (Harris, 2010; Jain et al., 2010). Authors such as Commander, Kangasniemi and 
Winters (2004) emphasized that early models found that emigration of skilled labor 
would be harmful through the impact on wages, employment, and fiscal costs. They 
also showed that the more recent literature has argued that a beneficial “brain gain” 
takes place under the effects of educational externalities. But the empirical findings 
of Beine, Docquier and Özden (2009) suggest that education-based selection rules 
are likely to have moderate impact. Bhargava, Docquier and Moullan (2010) 
quantified the effects of physician emigration on human development indicators in 
developing countries. The model used suggests a positive effect of migration 
prospects on medical training but the magnitude of this effect is too small to 
generate a net “brain gain” in the medical sector. These authors underline also that 
stopping physician brain drain has a small impact on human development. De la 
Croix and Docquier (2010) explore the complementarities between highly skilled 
emigration and poverty in developing countries through a model with human-
capital accumulation, highly skilled migration and productivity. Their results show 
that two countries sharing the same characteristics can exhibit different impacts on 
poverty. Camacho (2010) uses a model with an economy composed of two sectors 
and two regions while allowing for skilled migration. The solution path attained 
converges to a steady state that exhibits a distribution of skills between regions but 
with no evidence of symmetry.  The new steady state obtained depends on 
technology, fixed costs, knowledge spillovers and transportation costs. 
Lodigiani (2009) provides stylized facts on the magnitude and skill composition of 
migration and explores the main findings on “brain drain”. It focuses also on 
diaspora networks and on the major channels that foster economic development in 
source countries of emigration.  Docquier and Rapoport (2009) contribute further to 
the literature through adding three case studies on the African medical brain drain, 
the exodus of European researchers to the United States, and the contribution of the 
Indian diaspora to the rise of the IT sector in India. The three cases are related to the 
“very upper tail of the skill and education distribution”. Their effects on the source 
countries exhibit mixed results.  These mixed types of results are also found in 
Beine, Docquier and Rapoport (2009).  
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The most recent empirical studies conducted under the Consortium for Applied 
Research on International Migration (CARIM) show that the North African countries 
with some other MENA economies are major sources of emigration to the rest of the 
world. For Morocco (Khachani, 2010), the emigration of highly-skilled labor has 
become significant. The paper indicates also that while emigration brings a net 
socio-economic gain at the individual level, it represents a loss from the 
macroeconomic perspective for the country of origin. Belguendouz (2010) 
recognizes also the extent of skilled labor expatriates from the experiences and 
policies devoted to create incentives to reverse the emigration trend. The study on 
Tunisia by Belhaj Zekri (2010) identifies the preliminary success of skilled 
Tunisians entering the Gulf countries labor markets. The study recognizes also the 
domestic difficulties in job markets and thus the emigration of skilled labor in 
Tunisia, even under new policies for retention and return.  
Studies by Nessar (2010) insists on the role the education received by the skilled 
migrants in relation to the transfers in the case of Egypt. Sika (2010) finds that 
highly skilled emigration patterns from Egypt, to the OECD and the Gulf, contribute 
positively to the development process of Egypt. But, Ghoneim (2010) views that the 
deteriorating Egyptian education system producing less qualified labor lead to 
increasing emigration as a result of excess labor supply.  
Through series of surveys, Khawaja (2010) identifies further waves for skilled 
emigration from Palestine. The emigration of skilled labor is also recognized to be 
pervasive in Libya (Maghur, 2010). Algeria is also suffering from the emigration of 
skilled labor (Bouklia, 2010 and Labdelaoui, 2010). Olwan (2010) attributes highly 
skilled labor migration to the prevailing economic and social conditions in Jordan. 
The same trend is expressed by Syria (Marzouk, 2010 and Yazji Yakoub, 2010).   
But, the new economics of skilled labor has identified potential gains that could 
benefit the source economy as emigration of skills can induce further quantitative 
and qualitative domestic training and graduation from domestic higher education 
systems. The overall net effects of the emigration and the domestic training and 
graduation is translated into a net effect that can be either “brain drain” or “brain 
gain” depending on the situation of each economy. This  new type of literature has 
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emerged following the contributions of Mountford (1997), Vidal (1998), Beine et al. 
(2003), Stark et al. (2005), Duc Thanh (2004) and M. Schiff (2005), among others.  
Open economies with immigration are attractive since wages of skilled workers are 
higher that those prevailing in the source countries. According to Beine & al (2002), 
the human capital migration can be globally beneficial to the country of origin when 
the brain effect dominates the drain effect for the country of emigration.  
Stark’s theory (Stark et al., 2005) points to the fact that the prospect of migration 
may result in the formation of a socially desirable level of human capital. The 
expected higher returns to human capital in the destination country influence the 
decisions about the acquisition of skills in the country of origin (Stark, 2005).  
However, the analysis of the behavior of skilled labor denotes some degree of 
aversion towards risk that is not really taken into consideration by the literature on 
skilled labor migration. So, the analysis of labor decisions under risk is important in 
the process of identifying the optimal human capital and the optimal emigration 
rates for skilled labor (Schechter, 2005; Schechter, 2006). Other authors 
emphasized the relationships between the levels of initial wealth, income and levels 
of risk aversion (Rabin, 2000; Rabin & Thaler, 2001; Chetty, 2003). 
 
II. The Economic Model 
 
The model used in this paper is not different from the one developed in Driouchi, 
Baudassé, Boboc and Zouag (2009).  The basic features of this model are from Stark 
et al., (2005). After the underlying assumptions, the cases of risk neutrality and 
aversion are introduced with their related comparative statics.  
1. Model Assumptions 
Labor productivity in a given economy is represented by β . It is equivalent to 
private returns to labor, as in Stark et al (2005). In the context of this model, β  
takes values Sβ  in the source and Dβ  in the destination countries. The private 
returns in the destination countries are considered to be higher than those in the 
sending countries ( D Sβ β> ). It is assumed here that emigration decisions are 
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uniquely based on the levels of β that can be either Dβ or Sβ with respective 
probabilities m and (1 )m− .  
In this model, each emigrant (given the static nature of the model) seeks a level of 
education h  (considered as an individual investment in human capital) under the 
linear cost function ch with c being the unit cost of education. Furthermore, the 
level of education h is valued through a production function ( )g h ah γ= (the output 
of human capital) where0 1γ< < , '( ) 0g h > , "( ) 0g h <  and a is the talent of 
individuals. 
Each agent is consequently assumed to get (as a student) or to have the level of 
education h  (after graduation) based on the maximization of an objective function 
( ) ( )SV h g h chβ= −  in the absence of emigration (closed economy) and his expected 
utility in case of emigration (open economy). This latter option is the one 
considered in this paper where the model is accounting for risk neutrality and risk 
aversion.  
 
2. Derivation of the theoretical decision rules under risk neutrality 
Under the above assumptions, each individual in the economy is assumed to 
emigrate with probability m in order to achieve an overall net benefit in relation to 
the realization of the random variable β  ( Dβ and Sβ respectively with probabilities 
m and (1 )m− ). 
This implies that the overall objective function in case of risk neutrality is given by 
the expected earnings related to this choice: 
( ) ( ) (1 ) ( )D SV h m g h m g h chβ β= + − −                                                                             
The necessary and sufficient conditions (given the concavity of ( )g h ) for a 
maximum V to hold are given by the optimal value of h : 
( )
1
1
*
D S S
c
h
a m
γ
γ β β β
− 
=  
 − +   
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The aggregate stock of migrant skilled human capital is given by:  
( )
1
1
D S S
c
H N
a m
γ
γ β β β
− 
=  
 − +   
 where N is the total population that is willing to 
emigrate.  
 
The aggregate stock of human capital remaining in the country (non emigrant) is: 
( )
1
1
(1 )N
D S S
c
H m N
a m
γ
γ β β β
− 
= −  
 − +   
                                                                  (1)    
Under absence of emigration (m=0), the stock of human capital in the country of 
origin is:  
[ ]
1
1
0N
S
c
H N
a
γ
γ β
− 
=  
  
 
The relative domestic human capital remaining in the source country is:                                               
1
1
0
(1 ) 1 1N D
SN
H
m m
H
γβ
β
−    = − − +       
                                                                         (2) 
The following questions are related to the variations of the aggregate domestic 
relative human capital. 
 
2.1 Variations with respect to the emigration rate and optimal emigration 
 
Depending on the level of m, relative wages and gamma, the changes in the relative 
human capital relative to gamma can be positive or negative. For values of m higher 
than m*, the derivative is negative while positive below this value. 
 
1
1
0 0 0
1 1
/ ( / ) (1 ) 1 1N DN
SN
H
m H m m m
H H H
γβ
β
−    ∂ ∂ = ∂ ∂ = − − +       
 
 
As in (Appendix, Demo 1, Demo 2 and Demo 3) the maximal emigration rate among 
other results is given by:                                                                                
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*
(2 ) ( / ) (2 )
( )(2 ) (( / ) 1)(2 )
D S D S
N
D S D S
m
β γ β β β γ
β β γ β β γ
   − − − −   = =
− − − −
 
 
Again, *Nm is a function of relative wages and of γ .  
 
The relative human capital varies in the same sense with respect to relative wages.  
1
0
1
/ ( ) (1 ). .( ) 1 1 0
1
N D D
S SN
H
m m m
H
γ
γβ β
β βγ
−    ∂ ∂ = − − + >    −    
 
It also varies following the direction of γ as: 
 
2
1
1
0
/ ( ) (1 ).(1/(1 )) ln 1 1 1 1 0N D D
S SN
H
m m m
H
γβ βγ γ β β
−        ∂ ∂ = − − − + − + >               
 
 
Increases (respectively decreases) in γ  leads to increases (decreases) in the relative 
net human capital gains.  
 
*
( / ) (2 )
/ ( / ) / ( / )
(( / ) 1))(2 )
D S
N D S D S
D S
m
β β γ
β β β β
β β γ
 − − ∂ ∂ = ∂ ∂
− −
 
The optimal emigration rate increases (decreases respectively) with increases 
(decreases) of the relative wages (wage in destination relative to that at the origin). 
The optimal rate of emigration changes also in the same direction with changes in 
γ . 
 
2
*
2
( (2 ) (2 )
/ ( / ) 0
(( / ) 1)(2 ))
N D S
D S
m
γ γ
β β
β β γ
 − − + − ∂ ∂ = >
− −
 
 
*
2
( / )(( / ) 1)
/ ( ) 0
(( / ) 1)(2 ))
D S D S
N
D S
m
β β β β
γ
β β γ
−
∂ ∂ = >
− −
 
 
 
2.2  The level of m that equates HN with H0 
 
This level is given by: 
1
1
0
(1 ) 1 1 1N D
SN
H
m m
H
γβ
β
−    = − − + =       
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This is achieved with m=0, with HN = H0 and with m=m* because of the concavity of 
HN.  
 
This implies that m** is given by the second zero of the following equation: 
 
(1 )(1/(1 ) ) 1 1D
S
m mγ
β
β
−  − = − + 
 
 
 
The values of m** indicate how the economy enters the net brain drain phase. The 
higher is m**, the better off is the economy as the brain drain occurs at higher 
probabilities of emigration. Lower m** is an indication of higher brain drain and 
then the sensitiveness of the economy to the loss.  
These trends are discussed below under different simulations of the relative wages 
and the schooling yieldγ . 
 
m** for different gamma and relative wages
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
Relative wages
m**
m** gamma = 0.1
m** gamma = 0.2
m** gamma = 0.3 
m** gamma = 0.4
m** gamma = 0.5 
m** gamma = 0.6
m** gamma = 0.7
m** gamma = 0.8
 
 
m** increases with relative wages meaning that the relative human capital starts to 
be less than the domestic human capital while at lower relative wages, m** is lower. 
The value of the curve of m** as a function of relative wages is higher under higher 
gammas. This implies that the changes from lower values to higher values of 
gammas meaning from lower to higher valuation of education, m** gets higher. It 
attains the level 1 under gamma = 0.8 or the highest level of valuation of education. 
Lower m** is expected under lower gamma.  
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2.3 The shape of H as a function of m 
 
 
 
3. Emigration under Risk Aversion: 
 
In case of risk aversion, a constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) function is used 
(Harrison & al, 2005) as 
1
( )
1
rx
U x
r
−
=
−
 or ( )
x
U x
α
α
= , ( ] ]0,1α ∈ ), where 1 rα = −  and 
r is the CRRA coefficient.  
Under the above assumptions, the objective function is formulated as: 
( ) . ( ( )) (1 ). ( ( ))D SV h mU g h m U g h chβ β= + − −  or: 
(1 )
( ) D S
m m
V h a h a h chα α γα α α γαβ β
α α
−
= + −                                                                       
Given the concavity of ( )V h , the necessary and sufficient condition for a maximum 
leads to the maximal level of education to be: 
1
1
*
( )D S S
c
h
a m
γα
α α α αγ β β β
− 
 =
 − +   
                                                                                  (3) 
The aggregate stock of skilled human capital in case of risk aversion under 
emigration is given by: 
m 
H 
m* 0 
HN0 
1 
B 
Net human capital gain 
Net human capital loss 
m** 
A 
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1
1
*.
( )
T
D S S
c
H N h N
a m
γα
α α α αγ β β β
− 
 = =
 − +   
 
where N is the total labor force in the economy.  
 
The human capital remaining in the source economy, in case of emigration under 
risk aversion is given by: 
(1 )R TH m H= −      or: 
1
1
(1 )
( )
R
D S S
c
H m N
a m
γα
α α α αγ β β β
− 
 = −
 − +   
                                                                  (4) 
 
1
1
0R
S
c
H N
a
γα
α αγ β
− 
 =
    
 
 
0
(1/(1 ))
/ (1 ) (( / ) 1) 1)R R D SH H m m
α α αγβ β
−
 = − − +                                                              (5) 
 
 
3.1: Changes in Optimal Human Capital: 
The variations of the domestic human capital formation RH  in relation to m are 
considered also important to be taken into account. These variations are analyzed 
using the first and second derivatives of RH that are respectively given by 
(Appendix, Demo 2): 
(1 )( ) (1 ) ( )
.
(1 )(1 ) ( )
D S D S SR
R
D S S
m mH
H
m m m
α α α α α
α α α
β β γα β β β
γα β β β
 − − − − − +∂  =
∂  − − − + 
                                                
( )
2
2 2
2
(1 )( ) 2(1 ) ( )
(1 ) (1 ) ( )
D S D S SR
R D S
D S S
m mH
H
m m m
α α α α α
α α
α α α
γα β β γα β β β
β β
γα β β β
  − − − − − +∂   = −  
∂  − − − +   
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Under the condition
[ ]
(2 )(1 )
(2 )
D
S
m
m
α
α
β γα
β γα γα
− −
>
− −
, the second derivative of H is negative 
implying that ( )RH m  is concave and that the maximum of H is obtained through the 
necessary and sufficient condition that is 0R
H
m
∂
=
∂
 (Appendix, Demo 3). This implies 
that the optimal value for the emigration rate is given by:  
*
(2 )
( )(2 )
α α
α α
β γα β
β β γα
 − − =
− −
D S
D S
m                                                                                                   (5) 
 
The optimal emigration rate that can be obtained for the maximization of H appears 
to be directly related to most of the parameters of the problem. It has to be noted 
though that the numerator should be positive in order to meet the conditions 
imposed onm . This leads to the following restriction: ( )1 2
α
α
β
γα
β
≤ − ≤ D
S
 (i). This 
condition implies that ( )2 γα−  is the minimal value for the relative productivity or 
relative wage below which migration is not optimal.  
The above results are shown in Figure 2 where point A refers to the maximum of 
H attained at *m . Point B corresponds to **m ii where RH starts getting lower 
than 0RH iii.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
i  *0 1≤ ≤m , means that 0 1
( )(2 ) ( )
αα
α α α α
ββ
β β γα β β
≤ − ≤
− − −
SD
D S D S
. This is equivalent to ( )2
α
α
β
γα
β
≥ −D
S
and 
(2 ) 1γα− ≥ , which implies that ( )1 2
α
α
β
γα
β
≤ − ≤ D
S
. 
ii 
**m is the solution of the following equation: ( )
11
11(1 ) ( )D S S Sm m
α α α α γαγαβ β β β −− − − + =   
iii 0RH  is the value of RH  attained at 0=m  with 
1
1
0
S
c
H N
a
γα
α αγ β
− 
=  
 
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Figure 2: Domestic human capital stock with emigration and risk aversion 
 
Proposition 2: A net human capital gain (brain gain) results when the value of 
human capital, under different values of emigration rate, is superior to the value of 
the initial human capital under the absence of emigration. The human capital gain 
can reach a maximal value at *m and returns to its initial value at **m , while brain 
drain starts when human capital is lower than 0RH .  
 
Effects of Changes in risk attitudes: 
In order to refine the understanding of aggregate decisions, variations with respect 
to the level of risk aversion (α ) are useful as aggregate decisions include a large 
variation of risk attitudes of skilled labor migrants.  
For that purpose, the relative human capital (
0R RH H ) as well as the optimal (
*m ) 
emigration rate are analyzed in relation to changes in risk attitude (α ). 
The functions for the relative human capital and its first derivative are respectively 
given by (Appendix, Demo 4): 
m 
HR 
m* 0 
HRO 
1 
B 
Net human capital gain 
Net human capital loss 
m** 
A 
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( )
1
1
0
(1 )
D S S
R
R S
mH
m
H
α α α γα
α
β β β
β
−  − +  = −  
  
                                                                                     (6) 
( ) ( ){R R0 1D S D S D S
D S D S
H H 1 m
[m( / 1) 1] m. ln ( / )
1
                [m( / 1) 1] ln[m( / 1) 1]
(1 )
γα
α α α αγα
α α α α
β β β β β β
α γα
γ
β β β β
γα
−∂ −  = − + + ∂ −

+ − + ⋅ − + ⋅ 
− 
                        (7) 
Since ] ]0,1α ∈ , ( )R R0H H
α
∂
∂
is positive and the function 0H H is increasing with α 
(Appendix, Demo 4). 
 
Furthermore, using expressions (2) and (6), it can be easily shown that for 
any ] ]0,1α ∈ , ( )0 0R R N NH H H H< . Equality in relative human capital occurs 
when 1α =  
 
Figure 2 shows the shape of 0R RH H as function ofα . It has to be noted though that 
the function starts at value higher than ( )1−m  as ( )0α = is not included. 
When 1α = , this is the case of risk neutrality. In addition, the sign of the second 
derivative of 0H H  as function ofα  is positive (Appendix, Demo 4). 
 
Figure 3: Effects of the Level of Risk Aversion on the Relative Domestic Human 
Capital Curve 
 
Proposition 3: 0H H under relative risk aversion is lower than the level occurring 
under risk neutrality. This says that higher attainment in relative human capital is 
achieved under neutrality to risk.  
 
α = 1 - CRRA 
0R RH H  
1 
1-m 
( )0N NH H  
0 
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Regarding the optimal level of skilled labor migration, the derivative of *m  
(expression (5)) is given by (Appendix, Demo 5): 
 
*
2 2
(2 )(1 )[ln( ) ln( )] ( )
( ) (2 )
α α α α α α α
α α
β β γα γα β β γβ β β
α β β γα
− − − + −∂
=
∂ − −
D S D S D D S
D S
m
. 
 
This derivative is always positive within the interval of definition of ] ]0,1α ∈ , 
implying that *m  increases (decreases) with increases (decreases) in α  (Appendix, 
Demo 5). 
 
The maximum value of *m  is obtained for 1α = , that is 
[ ]* (2 )(1)
(2 )( )
β γ β
γ β β
− −
=
− −
D S
D S
m , 
which equals the value of *m under risk neutrality (Appendix, Demo 6): 
( )
( )( )
* *
2
(1)
2
β γ β
γ β β
− −  = =
− −
D S
RN
D S
m m                                                                                      (8) 
In addition, it can be easily shown from expressions (5) and (8) that for 
any ] ]0,1α ∈ , * *< RNm m .  
 
Figure 3 draws the shape of *m as function ofα .  
 
Figure 4: Effects of the Level of Risk Aversion on the Relative Domestic Human 
Capital Curve  
 α = 1 - CRRA 
*m
 
1  
*
Nm  
0 
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Proposition 4: The optimal emigration rate ( *m ) under relative risk aversion is 
lower than the level occurring under risk neutrality. This says that higher 
attainment in optimal emigration is reached under neutrality to risk.  
 
III. Empirical Investigations 
 
Using the available data and mainly the database of Marfouk, the case of emigration 
of medical doctors in the Arab World is used for empirical investigations. This 
analysis is based on the data on the emigration of medical doctors in the Middle East 
and North African region provided in A. Bhargava, F.Docquier and Y.Moullan (2010). 
Prior versions of this database are by F.Docquier and A. Marfouk (2006 and 2008).  
 
1. Descriptive analysis 
As said above, the “Medical Brain Drain” is a new panel data on physicians’ 
emigration rates (1991-2004). This dataset is recognized by the authors as a 
product of the Trade Team - Development Research Group which is part of a larger 
effort in the group to measure the extent of the brain drain as part of the 
International Migration and Development Program. According to this database, the 
MENA countries have shown high levels of emigration of medical doctors. The main 
countries of destination are UK, USA, France, Canada, Germany, Belgium, Australia, 
Italy, Sweden, Switzerland and Austria. Given the lack of data on some countries like 
Mauritania and Sudan, the current empirical investigation focuses on the remaining 
countries that are Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Jordan, Syria, Turkey and 
Yemen.  
The total emigration rate related to all destinations ranges from 0.1% to 12%. 
Intermediate levels are recognized for the remaining countries with values between 
two and four percent.  
Even though the rate in 2004 appears to be high, the trends expressed over the 
period 1991-2004 are constant or decreasing for most of the countries in the region. 
The countries displaying increasing rates are Algeria and Libya. All the other 
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countries have either constant or decreasing annual trends. The decreases, even if 
statistically significant, are still low. Syria, Jordan and Egypt have revealed an 
important reduction in their rates of emigration of physicians.  
Two observations related to the 1991-2004 trends (table 2) expressed by each 
country can be introduced. The first observation is that the decreases are low. The 
second observation is that these trends are obtained from net emigration rates and 
may also be related to other factors that are outside the willingness of these 
countries to retain their medical doctors.  
The emigration rate needs to be viewed with the domestic availability of medical 
doctors. When this latter variable is measured by the number of physicians per 
1,000 people for each country, large variations appear. Egypt attains a level above 
two doctors per 1,000 people. The other countries are largely below two doctors per 
1,000 people with most of them being between one and 1.5.  
 
Table 1: Country annual trends in number of physicians per 1,000 people 
 
R 
squared Intercept 
t-stat 
constant Coefficient 
t-stat 
coefficient Observations 
Algeria 0.70 0.84 40.12 0.02 5.31 14 
Egypt 0.71 1.32 12.59 0.08 5.49 14 
Jordan 0.93 1.38 37.86 0.06 12.60 14 
Libya 0.02 1.31 49.78 0.00 -0.51 14 
Morocco 0.77 0.24 8.89 0.02 6.40 14 
Syria 0.87 0.87 21.58 0.05 9.09 14 
Tunisia 0.35 0.62 23.29 0.01 2.54 14 
Turkey 0.48 0.94 14.18 0.03 3.36 14 
Yemen 0.33 0.17 10.76 0.005 2.45 14 
 
The most important element in this analysis is the trend pursued by each country 
with regard to the domestic availability of doctors. Table 1 shows the annual trends 
for each country. These trends are statistically significant for Egypt (0.08), Jordan 
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(0.06) and Syria (0.05). The other countries have lower annual changes ranging 
from zero (Libya) to 0.03 (Turkey). The remaining countries have annual rates of 
0.01 (Tunisia) and 0.02 (Algeria and Morocco). The estimated rate for Yemen is 
0.005. Furthermore, all the countries in the sample have statistically significant 
intercepts that are generally high, with the exception of Yemen.  It can be noted that 
Lebanon has the highest trend meaning that domestic staffing by medical doctors 
has been improving during 1991-2004. This is clearly consistent with the trend 
expressed by the domestic availability.  
Table 2: Trends of Annual emigration rates and stocks of medical doctors  
Rate of Migration Stock of Migrants Country 
R² Intercept Coefficient R² Intercept Coefficient 
Algeria 0.85 0.002 
(0.78) 
0.003 
(8.19) 
0.87 -45.54 
(-0.51) 
103.95 
(8.91) 
Egypt 0.50 0.07 
(17.85) 
-0.002 
(-3.49) 
0.98 5452.87 
(74.90) 
248.32 
(26.09) 
Jordan 0.54 0.08 
(43.60) 
0.0009 
(3.79) 
0.99 393.98 
(30.87) 
57.32 
(34.36) 
Libya 0.99 0.05 
(33.99) 
0.006 
(33.58) 
0.99 265.91 
(18.96) 
61.48 
(33.53) 
Morocco 0.46 0.07 
(11.56) 
-0.003 
(-3.21) 
0.97 432.98 
(42.54) 
25.86 
(19.43) 
Syria 0.37 0.17 
(36.11) 
-0.002 
(-2.69) 
0.99 2268.54 
(48.09) 
195.44 
(31.69) 
Tunisia 0.002 0.03 
(19.46) 
-0.00004 
(-0.18) 
0.92 173.88 
(45.50) 
5.78 
(11.57) 
Turkey 0.18 0.04 
(12.41) 
-0.0007 
(-1.63) 
0.94 2177.62 
(66.57) 
60.84 
(14.23) 
Yemen 0.03 0.01 
(9.31) 
-0.0001 
(-0.59) 
0.92 27.44 
(17.09) 
2.47 
(11.76) 
 
 
 
2. Testing for the validity of the theoretical  model  
 
This conducted in different steps with discussion on different parameters where the 
first one is related to education, the second one to relative wages while the last one 
introduces the behavioral parameter related to risk aversion. The assessment of 
these three sets of parameters will allow for the calculation of the theoretical 
relative domestic capital in each economy. These values are then compared with the 
observed relative capital as it is shown the published data on emigration of medical 
doctors. The theoretical and observed means of the values relative to each country 
and over 1991-2004 are then compared.  
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2.1: Estimations of the parameters for education 
 
The parameters γ and a  are estimated from a regression model where the 
dependent variable is the normalized Gross Tertiary Enrollment (GTEN) in 2004, 
published in the WBI website for 86 selected developing economies. The 
independent variable is the normalized average years of schooling (AYSN) of 
workers in 2000 (World Bank Institute, 2007) for the same countries.  This 
regression provides the following results. This is used with the 86 countries as no 
meaningful outcomes are attained with the data on MENA countries, mainly due to 
limitations in the number of observations. More details about these results are 
provided in Driouchi et al., (2009).  
Regression results for γ and a  estimations: 
Regression result R² Obs. γ  a 
(5.75) (13.88)
ln( ) 0.49 0.73ln( )GTEN AYSN= +  0.70 86 0.73 1.64 
 
The results of this regression show significant intercept and coefficient (t-stat given 
below each estimate). From these results, the exponent of h in g(h) is also obtained 
to be 0.73. Using these parameter estimates, country specific effects of emigration of 
medical doctors are discussed.  
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The above shows clearly that as γ increases (decreases), the physical productivity of 
education increases (decreases) as expected from the sign of the derivative of g(h) 
with respect to γ with h higher than 1. Lower γ is equivalent to lower productivity of 
education while higher γ is equivalent to higher productivity of education. The 
above estimated γ may indicate that the candidates for emigration are those with 
0.73 and this is a high level of γ.  
 
 
 
2.2. Relative wages 
 
Given the distribution of salaries as well as the percent of medical doctors per 
European and American destinations and using 1 for North African, 1.5 for other 
Middle East, 2 for Golf, 3 for Europe and 4 for America, a weighted relative wage is 
computed as given in table 4. The US wage data are provided by the US doctor 
annual wages for average median specialty and for starting doctors provided under 
“Physician Compensation Survey, By the American Medical Group Association 
(AMGA)”. The European data are by OECD databases (2009).  The MENA wages for 
medical doctors are taken from different websites for different countries as 
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summarized in table 3. Table 4 introduces the relative wages to be used in the 
calculations.  
Table 3: Minimal wages for medical doctors in MENA countries 
Countries Doctors salaries per month 
New Generalist: 727 to 1200 € Morocco 
Specialist : 1200 to 2000 € 
Generalist: 250  to 500 €  Algeria 
Specialist: 550 to 2000 € 
Generalist: 791  to 1200 € Tunisia 
Specialist: 1200 to 2000 € 
Doctors starts at 53$/month  Egypt 
Doctors with experience: 1000 $ 
Fresh graduates doctor: 325JD  (1 JD=1.41 $  in 2010 Jordan 
Doctors with experience (more than 15 years): 800JD  
In western cities, Doctors are paid approximately 3500,00-4000,00YTL  in the private sector 1YTL= 0.64 $ in 2010 
Doctors are paid approximately: 15000,00 YTL in public sector 
Turkey 
In eastern and southern cities 15000,00 YTL ,  
average wage in this region is: 10,000YTL  
Yemen The income of Yemeni physicians ranges between YR 19,000 and YR 340,000  1YR=0.005 $ in 2010 
 
 
 
Table 4: 1991-2004 Percentage of emigrant medical doctors and relative salaries by major 
destinations 
 
Country of Training %EU 
% 
America 
Weighted 
relative 
wages 
Algeria 86.45 13.55 3.14 
Bahrain 7.22 92.78 1.96 
Egypt 32.41 67.59 3.68 
Iran 28.32 71.68 3.72 
Iraq 58.40 41.60 3.42 
Jordan 42.44 57.56 2.38 
Kuwait 16.77 83.23 1.92 
Lebanon 11.18 88.82 2.59 
Libya 86.89 13.11 3.13 
Morocco 95.49 4.51 3.05 
Occupied Palestinian Territory 41.51 58.49 3.58 
Oman 26.84 73.16 1.87 
Saudi Arabia 24.32 75.68 1.88 
Sudan 85.17 14.83 3.15 
Syria 24.72 75.28 2.50 
Tunisia 91.82 8.18 3.08 
Turkey 37.18 62.82 3.63 
United Arab Emirates 1.27 98.73 1.99 
Yemen 82.57 17.43 3.17 
 
 
2.3: Risk aversion coefficients 
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Estimates of the constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) coefficient appear to be 
varying throughout the economic literature but all estimations tend to be around 1. 
Chetty (2003) found that positive uncompensated wage elasticity can result in a 
CRRA coefficient below 1.25, while the labor supply literature indicates that CRRA 
coefficient is close to 1. Szpiro (1986) found that the degree of relative risk aversion 
(the inverse of the CRRA coefficient) is approximately 2 (meaning a CRRA of 0.5). 
Cicchetti and Dublin (1994) estimated the degree of relative risk aversion to be of 
0.6 (equivalent to a CRRA of 1.66). Fullenkamp et al (2003) considered that 
significant variations exist in the degree of relative risk aversion (between 0.64 and 
1.76) meaning a CRRA of 0.83. Hartley, Lanot and Walker (2005) tried to estimate 
the degree of risk aversion and the way it varies across individuals using data from a 
popular TV game-show. The major result of this analysis is that the constant relative 
risk aversion coefficient is 1.  
Halek and Eisenhower (2001) address the issue distinguishing between pure and 
speculative risks in order to understand risk aversion. Among their findings, they 
established that under both pure and speculative risks, individuals who already 
proved to be risk-takers by migrating across national borders are less risk averse 
compared with the native population. Also, unemployed people are more disposed 
to risk their current income for the possibility to double it (Haled and Eisenhower, 
2001). Harrison, Lau and Rutström (2005) found that the Danish population 
exhibited constant risk aversion attitudes with coefficients around 0.45, 0.68 and 
0.97. These attitudes are found to vary that with different socio-economic and 
demographic factors.  
 
2.4: Testing for the validity of the model for the MENA region 
As assumed above, medical doctors study medicine in their countries of origin but 
have to make decisions to emigrate by the end of their studies or later.  
The theoretical aggregate level of human capital that stays in the country is derived 
from the model with the introduction of the values of the parameter related to 
education γ  and the values of Dβ and Sβ  with the observed “m” for each country. 
These parameters are discussed in the above two sections. Different values of the 
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relative risk aversion coefficient are used including the one related to risk 
neutrality. The calculations provide the theoretical values of the relative net human 
capital that are given by the theoretical model.  
The observed relative human capital is obtained from the database considering the 
lowest value of m as corresponding to H0 with H as related to the other values of the 
emigration rates. This allows for the computation of the observed H/H0. Given that 
there are at least 14 values for the theoretical human capital and 13 remaining cases 
for the observed relative human capital, the mean and standard deviation are 
computed for each country.  
These allow for the conduct of a t-test from comparing the means of the theoretical 
and observed relative human capital in each country.  
The following table introduces the results of comparisons between observed and 
theoretical relative human capital per country in the sending MENA countries. 
The test described above has provided the following results for each country and for 
the overall sample of economies from the MENA region.  
 
Table 5: t-statistic from comparing theoretical and observed relative net human capital 
 Risk neutrality 
Risk Aversion 
with α=0.75 
Algeria -2.73**   
Egypt 0.03**   
Morocco  -0.30**   
Syria 3.48**   
Tunisia 2.01**   
Turkey -1.30**   
Yemen 0.28**   
Jordan -0.03**  
Libya    -3.03** 
** Significant at 99% probability level 
 
Except for Libya, where the test is validated under risk aversion, all the other 
countries appear to support the model under risk neutrality. But, even for Libya, the 
constant risk aversion coefficient is 0.75 meaning that is not distant from 1. Details 
related to the options of calculations with the implied results are included in the 
appendix.  
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Given these results, it can be inferred that the theoretical model used in this 
research does reproduce the data observed about the annual rates of emigration of 
medical doctors in the region as they are given by the database used. This is in favor 
of using the theoretical model selected to discuss the cases of each country and also 
the situation and trends in the overall MENA region.  
 
IV. Discussion of the Findings 
 
Based on the results attained (table 5) and given the level of emigration rate 
observed over the period 1991-2004 (table 2), all countries included in this analysis 
appear to be benefiting from brain gains in the area of medical doctors. This means 
that domestic medical education is operating such that economies can still support 
the emigration of medical doctors at the current ratio of medical doctors per capita 
(table 1).  Different results might be attained if the current staffing rates are further 
increased above the current observed trends (table 1). Under the current domestic 
educational system and with the current conditions of staffing, the countries under 
study appear to be enjoying brain gains. But, there are major variations expressed 
by the countries. The following set of graphs shows how Syria, Morocco, Tunisia, 
Egypt and Turkey and Libya with low maxima for domestic human capital (0.29, 
0.36, 0.37, 0.41, 0.41 and 0.54 respectively) can enter easily the brain drain region 
under increases in emigration or reduction in education capacity. Countries such as 
Yemen, Jordan and Algeria appear to be in different situation with relatively higher 
maximal values for prospective emigration rates of medical doctors (0.69, 0.63 and 
0.69 respectively). These results are confirmed with the information on m** that 
shows lower values for the first set of countries and almost the value of 1 for the 
second set of countries. Also,  the maximal levels of domestic human capital exhibits 
variations with the largest values shown by Algeria and Yemen (8.00), intermediate 
values for Jordan (2.75) and Libya (1.45) and lower figures for the remaining 
countries (Syria: 0.15; Morocco and Tunisia: 0.35; Turkey: 0.55 and Egypt: 0.6).  
Under the current trends of emigration (1991-2004) of medical doctors, 
maintaining the current capacity for training of medical doctors can lead to net 
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brain drain especially for the countries with low m* and low maximal values of the 
domestic human capital. The enhancement of the training capacity is a prospect that 
would account for these results and for the observed emigration trends. This 
requirement is not as instantaneous as it can appear for the set of countries with 
higher m* and higher values of the relative domestic human capital. These latters 
could have adjusted their training capacity earlier but needs to renew these 
adjustments through the enlargement of their training capacity.  
      
Net Domestic Human Capital and Emigration of Medical Doctors per country 
 
 
    Algeria (m*=0.69, m**=0.98)                        Egypt (m*=0.41, m**=0.78) 
             
 
      Jordan (m*=0.63, m**=0.96)                            Morocco (m*=0.36, m**=0.69) 
       
      
     Syria (m*=0.29, m**=0.55)                       Tunisia (m*=0.37, m**=0.7)  
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     Turkey (m*=0.41, m**=0.77)            Yemen (m*=0.69, m**=0.99) 
 
 
     Libya (m*=0.54, m**=0.91) 
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Conclusion 
Under a theoretical model derived from Stark’s et al. (2005) with the introduction of 
risk aversion (Driouchi et al., 2009), applications to most sending countries in the 
MENA region appears to be promising. The test of convergence between the 
observed values based on Docquier et al. (2010) data and the theoretical values 
obtained from the model is statistically conclusive. Parameters and indices are then 
derived from the domestic relative human capital for each country. They all show 
that these economies are enjoying globally brain gains in relation to the emigration 
of medical doctors. While risk neutrality applies to most countries, Libya has shown 
moderate risk aversion. The gains attained appear to exhibit low values and lower 
levels of the maximum level of emigration rates that would sustain these benefits. 
These countries are Syria, Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt and Turkey with low maxima for 
domestic human capital. The remaining countries show higher prospects in relation 
to these gains. This means that the economies under lower gains can enhance their 
capacity of education of medical doctors as means of enhancing their overall 
benefits. The other economies can still enjoy the gains for relatively longer periods 
but should be concerned about the linkages between emigration, education and 
related economic policies.  
The results attained under this research could benefit from further availability of 
more accurate databases on emigration, wages, and estimates of risk aversion and 
valuation of education.  The results could also be better if microeconomic data were 
available for each country. These are major directions for future improvements.  
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Appendix I 
Appendix I provides the proofs to support different sections in the theoretical 
part. These proofs are given for the general case of risk aversion as risk 
neutrality is a particular case (α=1).  
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Demo 3: Optimal emigration rate under risk neutrality  
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Appendix II: Calculations and tests related to the 
validation of the model 
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Country Years m Relative wage 
H/H0 
Theoretical  
gamma 0.73 
H/H0 
Theoretical 
gamma 0.25 
H/H0 
Observed 
1991 0.0094 3.14 1.0666 1.0173   
1992 0.0099 3.14 1.0702 1.0182   
1993 0.0104 3.14 1.0736 1.0191   
1994 0.0103 3.14 1.0728 1.0189   
1995 0.0105 3.14 1.0746 1.0193 1.0286 
1996 0.0097 3.14 1.0689 1.0179 1.1511 
1997 0.0097 3.14 1.0686 1.0178 1.2208 
1998 0.0160 3.14 1.1147 1.0292 1.2785 
1999 0.0222 3.14 1.1608 1.0401 1.2977 
2000 0.0281 3.14 1.2066 1.0506 1.3166 
2001 0.0337 3.14 1.2509 1.0604 1.3361 
2002 0.0390 3.14 1.2931 1.0694 1.3571 
2003 0.0405 3.14 1.3057 1.0720 1.3793 
2004 0.0418 3.14 1.3157 1.0741 1.3793 
Mean     1.1531 1.0374 1.2745 
Stand.dev.     0.1003 0.0230 0.1123 
Algeria 
t-stat (theoretical and observed H/H0) -2.7295 -6.5780   
1991 0.0901 3.68 2.0254 1.2136   
1992 0.0798 3.68 1.8843 1.1911   
1993 0.0719 3.68 1.7803 1.1734   
1994 0.0565 3.68 1.5888 1.1382   
1995 0.0554 3.68 1.5760 1.1358   
1996 0.0527 3.68 1.5439 1.1294   
1997 0.0640 3.68 1.6805 1.1555   
1998 0.0619 3.68 1.6543 1.1507   
1999 0.0567 3.68 1.5917 1.1388 1.0485 
2000 0.0544 3.68 1.5639 1.1334 1.1316 
2001 0.0552 3.68 1.5741 1.1354 1.1529 
2002 0.0554 3.68 1.5767 1.1359 1.1740 
2003 0.0552 3.68 1.5735 1.1353 1.1950 
2004 0.0562 3.68 1.5853 1.1376 1.1950 
Mean     1.6570 1.1503 1.1495 
Stand.dev.     0.1429 0.0252 0.0553 
E
g
y
p
t 
t-stat (theoretical and observed H/H0) 11.4420 0.0327   
1991 0.0796 2.38 1.3554 1.0580   
1992 0.0838 2.38 1.3755 1.0605   
1993 0.0826 2.38 1.3696 1.0598   
1994 0.0795 2.38 1.3546 1.0579   
1995 0.0828 2.38 1.3706 1.0599 1.0330 
1996 0.0850 2.38 1.3812 1.0612 1.0651 
1997 0.0872 2.38 1.3920 1.0625 1.1214 
J
o
rd
a
n
 
1998 0.0862 2.38 1.3871 1.0619 1.2537 
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1999 0.0806 2.38 1.3600 1.0586 1.4361 
2000 0.0824 2.38 1.3687 1.0597 1.4807 
2001 0.0858 2.38 1.3850 1.0617 1.5622 
2002 0.0880 2.38 1.3958 1.0630 1.6058 
2003 0.0921 2.38 1.4156 1.0653 1.6482 
2004 0.0983 2.38 1.4460 1.0688 1.6482 
Mean     1.3826 1.0614 1.3854 
Stand.dev.     0.0248 0.0030 0.2457 
t-stat (theoretical and observed H/H0) -0.0357 -4.1703   
1991 0.0559 3.13 1.4322 1.0969   
1992 0.0569 3.13 1.4413 1.0986 1.1048 
1993 0.0583 3.13 1.4529 1.1008 1.2478 
1994 0.0650 3.13 1.5122 1.1116 1.1915 
1995 0.0711 3.13 1.5663 1.1211 1.1701 
1996 0.0784 3.13 1.6336 1.1325 1.1933 
1997 0.0868 3.13 1.7122 1.1451 1.2075 
1998 0.0950 3.13 1.7916 1.1572 1.2312 
1999 0.1012 3.13 1.8526 1.1661 1.2554 
2000 0.1059 3.13 1.8993 1.1727 1.2799 
2001 0.1148 3.13 1.9905 1.1851 1.3053 
2002 0.1201 3.13 2.0462 1.1923 1.3315 
2003 0.1253 3.13 2.1011 1.1992 1.3587 
2004 0.1315 3.13 2.1685 1.2073 1.3587 
Mean     1.7572 1.1490 1.2489 
Stand.dev.     0.2584 0.0393 0.0766 
L
ib
y
a
 
t-stat (theoretical and observed H/H0) 7.0356 -4.2113   
1991 0.0862 3.05 1.6673 1.1347   
1992 0.0874 3.05 1.6776 1.1363   
1993 0.0826 3.05 1.6353 1.1296   
1994 0.0511 3.05 1.3710 1.0833   
1995 0.0477 3.05 1.3441 1.0781   
1996 0.0479 3.05 1.3455 1.0784   
1997 0.0423 3.05 1.3024 1.0698   
1998 0.0442 3.05 1.3168 1.0727 1.0170 
1999 0.0461 3.05 1.3314 1.0756 1.0340 
2000 0.0472 3.05 1.3405 1.0774 1.0511 
2001 0.0471 3.05 1.3399 1.0773 1.1218 
2002 0.0490 3.05 1.3545 1.0801 1.1399 
2003 0.0498 3.05 1.3608 1.0814 1.1581 
2004 0.0511 3.05 1.3710 1.0833 1.1581 
Mean     1.4113 1.0899 1.0971 
Stand.dev.     0.1364 0.0240 0.0611 
M
o
ro
c
c
o
  
t-stat (theoretical and observed H/H0) 7.2820 -0.3038   
1991 0.1760 2.50 1.9644 1.1265   
1992 0.1807 2.50 1.9939 1.1285   
1993 0.1781 2.50 1.9776 1.1274   S
y
ri
a
 
1994 0.1738 2.50 1.9505 1.1256   
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1995 0.1703 2.50 1.9287 1.1241   
1996 0.1648 2.50 1.8944 1.1216   
1997 0.1636 2.50 1.8872 1.1211   
1998 0.1384 2.50 1.7338 1.1083   
1999 0.1545 2.50 1.8311 1.1167   
2000 0.1536 2.50 1.8257 1.1163   
2001 0.1547 2.50 1.8327 1.1168 1.0465 
2002 0.1583 2.50 1.8545 1.1186 1.0722 
2003 0.1615 2.50 1.8745 1.1201 1.0974 
2004 0.1675 2.50 1.9111 1.1228 1.0974 
Mean     1.8900 1.1210 1.0783 
Stand.dev.     0.0715 0.0055 0.0243 
t-stat (theoretical and observed H/H0) 35.8294 3.4817   
1991 0.0390 3.08 1.2832 1.0664   
1992 0.0326 3.08 1.2336 1.0559   
1993 0.0328 3.08 1.2349 1.0562   
1994 0.0376 3.08 1.2720 1.0641   
1995 0.0317 3.08 1.2272 1.0545   
1996 0.0267 3.08 1.1890 1.0460   
1997 0.0298 3.08 1.2128 1.0513   
1998 0.0298 3.08 1.2122 1.0512   
1999 0.0312 3.08 1.2234 1.0537 1.0131 
2000 0.0321 3.08 1.2297 1.0550 1.0247 
2001 0.0330 3.08 1.2372 1.0567 1.0365 
2002 0.0345 3.08 1.2483 1.0591 1.0480 
2003 0.0349 3.08 1.2517 1.0598 1.0602 
2004 0.0357 3.08 1.2573 1.0610 1.0602 
Mean     1.2366 1.0565 1.0404 
Stand.dev.     0.0248 0.0053 0.0192 
T
u
n
is
ia
 
t-stat (theoretical and observed H/H0) 19.1090 2.0113   
1991 0.0368 3.63 1.3556 1.0893   
1992 0.0371 3.63 1.3594 1.0902   
1993 0.0377 3.63 1.3650 1.0914   
1994 0.0345 3.63 1.3321 1.0841   
1995 0.0346 3.63 1.3326 1.0842   
1996 0.0560 3.63 1.5694 1.1336   
1997 0.0295 3.63 1.2797 1.0721   
1998 0.0326 3.63 1.3115 1.0794 1.0178 
1999 0.0324 3.63 1.3100 1.0791 1.0521 
2000 0.0316 3.63 1.3013 1.0771 1.0941 
2001 0.0319 3.63 1.3039 1.0777 1.1070 
2002 0.0308 3.63 1.2926 1.0751 1.1783 
2003 0.0309 3.63 1.2936 1.0753 1.1967 
2004 0.0311 3.63 1.2960 1.0759 1.1967 
Mean     1.3359 1.0846 1.1204 
Stand.dev.     0.0724 0.0154 0.0719 
T
u
rk
e
y
 
t-stat (theoretical and observed H/H0) 6.4576 -1.3011   
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1991 0.0219 3.17 1.1618 1.0406   
1992 0.0151 3.17 1.1103 1.0283   
1993 0.0115 3.17 1.0829 1.0215   
1994 0.0119 3.17 1.0860 1.0223   
1995 0.0097 3.17 1.0701 1.0183   
1996 0.0109 3.17 1.0785 1.0204   
1997 0.0126 3.17 1.0916 1.0237   
1998 0.0125 3.17 1.0904 1.0234   
1999 0.0126 3.17 1.0911 1.0236   
2000 0.0131 3.17 1.0952 1.0246   
2001 0.0120 3.17 1.0871 1.0226 1.0514 
2002 0.0134 3.17 1.0974 1.0251 1.0838 
2003 0.0139 3.17 1.1010 1.0260 1.1171 
2004 0.0157 3.17 1.1145 1.0293 1.1171 
Mean     1.0970 1.0250 1.0924 
Stand.dev.     0.0220 0.0054 0.0315 
Y
e
m
e
n
 
t-stat (theoretical and observed H/H0) 0.2758 -4.2616   
 
 
 
Risk neutral summary table 
 
Country Statistics 
H/H0 
Theoretical  
gamma 0.73 
H/H0 
Theoretical 
gamma 0.25 
H/H0 
Observed 
Mean 1.1531 1.0374 1.2745 
Stand.dev. 0.1003 0.0230 0.1123 
t-stat  -2.7295 -6.5780   
Stand.dev. 0.0329 0.0030 0.2206 
Algeria 
t-stat  -5.5113 -6.1636   
Mean 1.6570 1.1503 1.1495 
Stand.dev. 0.1429 0.0252 0.0553 
t-stat  11.4420 0.0327   
Stand.dev. 1.0354 0.1060 0.0242 
t-stat  5.7173 7.6250   
Stand.dev. 0.4818 0.0447 0.0502 
Egypt 
t-stat  13.8425 9.6749   
Mean 1.3826 1.0614 1.3854 
Stand.dev. 0.0248 0.0030 0.2457 
t-stat  -0.0357 -4.1703   
Stand.dev. 0.0334 0.0017 0.0221 
t-stat  4.1789 -3.2897   
Stand.dev. 0.3367 0.0115 0.0074 
Jordan 
t-stat  15.8235 26.9164   
Mean 1.7572 1.1490 1.2489 
Stand.dev. 0.2584 0.0393 0.0766 Libya 
t-stat  7.0356 -4.2113   
Morocco  Mean 1.4113 1.0899 1.0971 
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Stand.dev. 0.1364 0.0240 0.0611 
t-stat  7.2820 -0.3038   
Stand.dev. 0.0238 0.0065 0.6975 
t-stat  -3.5022 -3.7402   
Stand.dev. 0.0051 0.0003 0.5282 
t-stat  -8.2383 -8.2749   
Stand.dev. 0.0038 0.0002 0.1361 
t-stat  -5.7748 -6.4037   
Mean 1.8900 1.1210 1.0783 
Stand.dev. 0.0715 0.0055 0.0243 Syria 
t-stat  35.8294 3.4817   
Mean 1.2366 1.0565 1.0404 
Stand.dev. 0.0248 0.0053 0.0192 Tunisia 
t-stat  19.1090 2.0113   
Mean 1.3359 1.0846 1.1204 
Stand.dev. 0.0724 0.0154 0.0719 
t-stat  6.4576 -1.3011   
Stand.dev. 0.0609 0.0037 0.0828 
Turkey 
t-stat  -0.9586 -4.3423   
Mean 1.0970 1.0250 1.0924 
Stand.dev. 0.0220 0.0054 0.0315 Yemen 
t-stat  0.2758 -4.2616   
 
 
Risk aversion model 
 
Country years m Relative wage 
H/H0 
Theoretical 
alpha=0.33 
H/H0 
alpha=0.5 
H/H0 
Theoretical  
alpha=0.75 
H/H0 
Observed 
1991 0.0094 3.14 0.9962 1.0019 1.0188   
1992 0.0099 3.14 0.9960 1.0020 1.0198   
1993 0.0104 3.14 0.9958 1.0021 1.0208   
1994 0.0103 3.14 0.9959 1.0021 1.0205   
1995 0.0105 3.14 0.9958 1.0022 1.0210 1.0286 
1996 0.0097 3.14 0.9961 1.0020 1.0195 1.1511 
1997 0.0097 3.14 0.9961 1.0020 1.0194 1.2208 
1998 0.0160 3.14 0.9935 1.0032 1.0319 1.2785 
1999 0.0222 3.14 0.9910 1.0043 1.0441 1.2977 
2000 0.0281 3.14 0.9884 1.0053 1.0558 1.3166 
2001 0.0337 3.14 0.9860 1.0062 1.0669 1.3361 
2002 0.0390 3.14 0.9837 1.0070 1.0772 1.3571 
2003 0.0405 3.14 0.9830 1.0072 1.0802 1.3793 
2004 0.0418 3.14 0.9825 1.0073 1.0825 1.3793 
Mean     0.9914 1.0039 1.0413 1.2745 
Stand.dev.     0.0055 0.0022 0.0258 0.1123 
A
lg
e
ri
a
 
t-stat (theoretical and observed H/H0) -7.9648 -7.6190 -6.4468   
1991 0.0901 3.68 0.9683 1.0311 1.2371   
E
g
y
p
t 
1992 0.0798 3.68 0.9725 1.0285 1.2103   
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1993 0.0719 3.68 0.9756 1.0263 1.1897   
1994 0.0565 3.68 0.9814 1.0216 1.1494   
1995 0.0554 3.68 0.9818 1.0213 1.1466   
1996 0.0527 3.68 0.9828 1.0204 1.1395   
1997 0.0640 3.68 0.9786 1.0240 1.1691   
1998 0.0619 3.68 0.9794 1.0233 1.1636   
1999 0.0567 3.68 0.9813 1.0217 1.1501 1.0485 
2000 0.0544 3.68 0.9821 1.0210 1.1440 1.1316 
2001 0.0552 3.68 0.9818 1.0212 1.1462 1.1529 
2002 0.0554 3.68 0.9817 1.0213 1.1468 1.1740 
2003 0.0552 3.68 0.9818 1.0212 1.1461 1.1950 
2004 0.0562 3.68 0.9815 1.0215 1.1487 1.1950 
Mean     0.9793 1.0232 1.1634 1.1495 
Stand.dev.     0.0043 0.0032 0.0292 0.0553 
t-stat (theoretical and observed H/H0) -7.5338 -5.5960 0.5799   
1991 0.0796 2.38 0.9526 0.9839 1.0757   
1992 0.0838 2.38 0.9499 0.9828 1.0793   
1993 0.0826 2.38 0.9507 0.9831 1.0783   
1994 0.0795 2.38 0.9527 0.9840 1.0756   
1995 0.0828 2.38 0.9506 0.9831 1.0785 1.0330 
1996 0.0850 2.38 0.9492 0.9825 1.0803 1.0651 
1997 0.0872 2.38 0.9478 0.9819 1.0822 1.1214 
1998 0.0862 2.38 0.9484 0.9822 1.0814 1.2537 
1999 0.0806 2.38 0.9520 0.9837 1.0765 1.4361 
2000 0.0824 2.38 0.9508 0.9832 1.0781 1.4807 
2001 0.0858 2.38 0.9487 0.9823 1.0810 1.5622 
2002 0.0880 2.38 0.9473 0.9817 1.0829 1.6058 
2003 0.0921 2.38 0.9447 0.9806 1.0863 1.6482 
2004 0.0983 2.38 0.9407 0.9788 1.0915 1.6482 
Mean     0.9490 0.9824 1.0805 1.3854 
Stand.dev.     0.0033 0.0014 0.0043 0.2457 
J
o
rd
a
n
 
t-stat (theoretical and observed H/H0) -5.6163 -5.1864 -3.9231   
1991 0.0559 3.13 0.9760 1.0088 1.1092   
1992 0.0569 3.13 0.9755 1.0089 1.1112 1.1048 
1993 0.0583 3.13 0.9749 1.0091 1.1138 1.2478 
1994 0.0650 3.13 0.9718 1.0097 1.1267 1.1915 
1995 0.0711 3.13 0.9689 1.0102 1.1381 1.1701 
1996 0.0784 3.13 0.9654 1.0107 1.1518 1.1933 
1997 0.0868 3.13 0.9613 1.0111 1.1673 1.2075 
1998 0.0950 3.13 0.9571 1.0113 1.1824 1.2312 
1999 0.1012 3.13 0.9540 1.0115 1.1937 1.2554 
2000 0.1059 3.13 0.9516 1.0115 1.2021 1.2799 
2001 0.1148 3.13 0.9470 1.0114 1.2180 1.3053 
2002 0.1201 3.13 0.9441 1.0113 1.2275 1.3315 
2003 0.1253 3.13 0.9414 1.0111 1.2366 1.3587 
2004 0.1315 3.13 0.9380 1.0109 1.2474 1.3587 
L
ib
y
a
 
Mean     0.9591 1.0105 1.1733 1.2489 
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Stand.dev.     0.0134 0.0010 0.0490 0.0766 
t-stat (theoretical and observed H/H0) -13.4453 -11.2121 -3.0288   
1991 0.0862 3.05 0.9602 1.0079 1.1566   
1992 0.0874 3.05 0.9596 1.0079 1.1586   
1993 0.0826 3.05 0.9620 1.0079 1.1503   
1994 0.0511 3.05 0.9774 1.0064 1.0944   
1995 0.0477 3.05 0.9790 1.0061 1.0882   
1996 0.0479 3.05 0.9789 1.0061 1.0886   
1997 0.0423 3.05 0.9815 1.0057 1.0785   
1998 0.0442 3.05 0.9806 1.0058 1.0819 1.0170 
1999 0.0461 3.05 0.9797 1.0060 1.0853 1.0340 
2000 0.0472 3.05 0.9792 1.0061 1.0874 1.0511 
2001 0.0471 3.05 0.9792 1.0061 1.0873 1.1218 
2002 0.0490 3.05 0.9784 1.0062 1.0906 1.1399 
2003 0.0498 3.05 0.9780 1.0063 1.0921 1.1581 
2004 0.0511 3.05 0.9774 1.0064 1.0944 1.1581 
Mean     0.9751 1.0065 1.1024 1.0971 
Stand.dev.     0.0079 0.0008 0.0289 0.0611 
M
o
ro
c
c
o
  
t-stat (theoretical and observed H/H0) -5.2650 -3.9253 0.2179   
1991 0.1760 2.50 0.8921 0.9607 1.1749   
1992 0.1807 2.50 0.8889 0.9589 1.1784   
1993 0.1781 2.50 0.8907 0.9599 1.1765   
1994 0.1738 2.50 0.8937 0.9615 1.1732   
1995 0.1703 2.50 0.8961 0.9628 1.1705   
1996 0.1648 2.50 0.8999 0.9647 1.1661   
1997 0.1636 2.50 0.9007 0.9651 1.1652   
1998 0.1384 2.50 0.9176 0.9734 1.1441   
1999 0.1545 2.50 0.9069 0.9682 1.1577   
2000 0.1536 2.50 0.9075 0.9685 1.1570   
2001 0.1547 2.50 0.9067 0.9681 1.1580 1.0465 
2002 0.1583 2.50 0.9043 0.9670 1.1609 1.0722 
2003 0.1615 2.50 0.9021 0.9658 1.1635 1.0974 
2004 0.1675 2.50 0.8980 0.9638 1.1682 1.0974 
Mean     0.9004 0.9649 1.1653 1.0783 
Stand.dev.     0.0079 0.0040 0.0094 0.0243 
S
y
ri
a
 
t-stat (theoretical and observed H/H0) -14.4100 -9.2860 6.9975   
1991 0.0390 3.08 0.9833 1.0060 1.0743   
1992 0.0326 3.08 0.9861 1.0052 1.0622   
1993 0.0328 3.08 0.9861 1.0052 1.0625   
1994 0.0376 3.08 0.9839 1.0058 1.0716   
1995 0.0317 3.08 0.9865 1.0051 1.0606   
1996 0.0267 3.08 0.9887 1.0044 1.0510   
1997 0.0298 3.08 0.9873 1.0048 1.0570   
1998 0.0298 3.08 0.9874 1.0048 1.0569   
1999 0.0312 3.08 0.9867 1.0050 1.0597 1.0131 
2000 0.0321 3.08 0.9864 1.0051 1.0612 1.0247 
T
u
n
is
ia
 
2001 0.0330 3.08 0.9859 1.0052 1.0631 1.0365 
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2002 0.0345 3.08 0.9853 1.0054 1.0658 1.0480 
2003 0.0349 3.08 0.9851 1.0055 1.0666 1.0602 
2004 0.0357 3.08 0.9848 1.0056 1.0680 1.0602 
Mean     0.9860 1.0052 1.0629 1.0404 
Stand.dev.     0.0014 0.0004 0.0061 0.0192 
t-stat (theoretical and observed H/H0) -6.9319 -4.4864 2.8021   
1991 0.0368 3.63 0.9880 1.0142 1.0954   
1992 0.0371 3.63 0.9879 1.0143 1.0963   
1993 0.0377 3.63 0.9877 1.0145 1.0976   
1994 0.0345 3.63 0.9888 1.0134 1.0896   
1995 0.0346 3.63 0.9888 1.0134 1.0897   
1996 0.0560 3.63 0.9811 1.0204 1.1448   
1997 0.0295 3.63 0.9905 1.0116 1.0766   
1998 0.0326 3.63 0.9895 1.0127 1.0845 1.0178 
1999 0.0324 3.63 0.9895 1.0127 1.0842 1.0521 
2000 0.0316 3.63 0.9898 1.0124 1.0820 1.0941 
2001 0.0319 3.63 0.9897 1.0124 1.0827 1.1070 
2002 0.0308 3.63 0.9901 1.0121 1.0798 1.1783 
2003 0.0309 3.63 0.9901 1.0121 1.0801 1.1967 
2004 0.0311 3.63 0.9900 1.0122 1.0807 1.1967 
Mean     0.9887 1.0134 1.0903 1.1204 
Stand.dev.     0.0024 0.0022 0.0170 0.0719 
T
u
rk
e
y
 
t-stat (theoretical and observed H/H0) -4.8420 -3.9317 -1.0915   
1991 0.0219 3.17 0.9912 1.0046 1.0445   
1992 0.0151 3.17 0.9940 1.0033 1.0308   
1993 0.0115 3.17 0.9955 1.0025 1.0234   
1994 0.0119 3.17 0.9953 1.0026 1.0242   
1995 0.0097 3.17 0.9962 1.0022 1.0198   
1996 0.0109 3.17 0.9957 1.0024 1.0222   
1997 0.0126 3.17 0.9950 1.0028 1.0258   
1998 0.0125 3.17 0.9951 1.0027 1.0254   
1999 0.0126 3.17 0.9950 1.0027 1.0256   
2000 0.0131 3.17 0.9948 1.0029 1.0267   
2001 0.0120 3.17 0.9952 1.0026 1.0245 1.0514 
2002 0.0134 3.17 0.9947 1.0029 1.0273 1.0838 
2003 0.0139 3.17 0.9945 1.0030 1.0283 1.1171 
2004 0.0157 3.17 0.9938 1.0034 1.0320 1.1171 
Mean     0.9947 1.0029 1.0272 1.0924 
Stand.dev.     0.0012 0.0006 0.0059 0.0315 
Y
e
m
e
n
 
t-stat (theoretical and observed H/H0) -6.2007 -5.6813 -4.1187   
 
 
 
 
Risk aversion model summary table 
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Country Statistics 
H/H0 
Theoretical 
alpha=0.33 
H/H0 
alpha=0.5 
H/H0 
Theoretical  
alpha=0.75 
H/H0 
Observed 
Mean 0.9914 1.0039 1.0413 1.2745 
Stand.dev. 0.0055 0.0022 0.0258 0.1123 
t-stat -7.9648 -7.6190 -6.4468   
Stand.dev. 0.0086 0.0049 0.0053 0.2206 
Algeria 
t-stat -6.4092 -6.3323 -6.1161   
Mean 0.9793 1.0232 1.1634 1.1495 
Stand.dev. 0.0043 0.0032 0.0292 0.0553 
t-stat -7.5338 -5.5960 0.5799   
Stand.dev. 0.0175 0.0015 0.0631 0.0502 
Egypt 
t-stat -13.6650 -7.2897 10.9278   
Mean 0.9490 0.9824 1.0805 1.3854 
Stand.dev. 0.0033 0.0014 0.0043 0.2457 
t-stat -5.6163 -5.1864 -3.9231   
Stand.dev. 0.0338 0.0210 0.0291 0.0074 
Jordan 
t-stat -16.4892 -10.8167 24.0007   
Mean 0.9591 1.0105 1.1733 1.2489 
Stand.dev. 0.0134 0.0010 0.0490 0.0766 
Libya 
t-stat -13.4453 -11.2121 -3.0288   
Mean 0.9751 1.0065 1.1024 1.0971 
Stand.dev. 0.0079 0.0008 0.0289 0.0611 
t-stat -5.2650 -3.9253 0.2179   
Stand.dev. 0.0016 0.0010 0.0007 0.5282 
t-stat -8.2898 -8.2850 -8.2720   
Stand.dev. 0.0012 0.0007 0.0005 0.1361 
Morocco  
t-stat -6.6596 -6.5773 -6.3540   
Mean 0.9004 0.9649 1.1653 1.0783 
Stand.dev. 0.0079 0.0040 0.0094 0.0243 Syria 
t-stat -14.4100 -9.2860 6.9975   
Mean 0.9860 1.0052 1.0629 1.0404 
Stand.dev. 0.0014 0.0004 0.0061 0.0192 Tunisia 
t-stat -6.9319 -4.4864 2.8021   
Mean 0.9887 1.0134 1.0903 1.1204 
Stand.dev. 0.0024 0.0022 0.0170 0.0719 
t-stat -4.8420 -3.9317 -1.0915   
Stand.dev. 0.0153 0.0093 0.0080 0.0828 
Turkey 
t-stat -5.5620 -5.1866 -4.0918   
Mean 0.9947 1.0029 1.0272 1.0924 
Stand.dev. 0.0012 0.0006 0.0059 0.0315 Yemen 
t-stat -6.2007 -5.6813 -4.1187   
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